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Current Developments in
Resulting Trusts and Constructive Trusts in Kentucky
By WESLEY GILMER, JR.*
I. CLASSIFICATION OF RESULTING TRUSTS AND
CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS AND THEIR DEFINITION.
Viewing the force which brings a trust into existence, all
trusts may be classified into trusts by intention and trusts by
operation of law.' There seems to be apparent agreement in the
point of view that an express trust and an implied trust are
brought about by the intention of the parties, and it is also ap-
parent that a constructive trust is one created, not by intention,
but by operation of law.2
With the express and implied trusts on one hand, and the
constructive trust on the other hand, we must find a place for the
resulting trust. Some authorities say that a resulting trust is an
implied-in-fact trust,3 and others say that it is an implied-in-law
trust.
4
The better view seems to be that a resulting trust is not
greatly different from an express trust, and that a resulting trust
is one of the trusts which enforces the intentions of the parties.5
In an express trust the intent is clear. In the implied trust the
intent for a trust, though not clear, is shown from surrounding
facts and circumstances to have been present.6 The latter descrip-
tion also fits a resulting trust, because the courts do not enforce a
resulting trust unless there is an indication of intention that the
A.B., Univ. of Cincinnati, 1949; LL.B., Univ. of Cincinnati, 1950. Board
of Editors, Cincinnati Law Review, 1950; member of Kentucky and Ohio Bars.
Attorney-at-law, Cowan Bldg., Danville, Kentucky.
154 Amd. Jun., Trusts 22; Costigan, The Classification of Trusts, 27 HIulv. L.
Rrv. 437 (1914).2 Dotson v. Dotson, 307 Ky. 106, 209 S.W. 2d 852 (1948); Long v. Reiss,
290 Ky. 198, 160 S.W. 2d 668 (1942); Noland v. Howard, 221 Ky. 33, 297 S.W.
942 (1927); Costigan, supra n. 1, at 448; 54 Am. Jun., Trusts 167.3 Costigan, supra n. 1, at 439; Nickels v. Clay, 14 Ky. L. Rep. 925 (1893).
'Wright v. Yates, 140 Ky. 283, 130 S.W. 1111 (1910); 54 Am. Jun., Trusts
147, 152.
'Wright v. Yates, supra n. 4; 54 Am. Junr., Trusts 152-154.
'Costigan, supra n. 1, at 437-439; 54 Am. Jun., Trusts 62-64.
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legal titleholder should not also have the beneficial interest7 This
survey shows us that a resulting trust is one of the intent-enforcing
trusts, though the least manifest, and that it is not merely raised
by law. Some may say that a resulting trust is only a creature of
judicial efforts to prevent a wrongdoer from unjustly enriching
himself by his own wrongdoing, but in rebuttal to that argument
we point out that it is a historical fact that such was the only
reason why courts of equity ever took jurisdiction of any trusts
at all.8
The constructive trust is the only trust that is not an intent-
enforcing trust, but rather is a trust by operation of law.9 The
constructive trust rectifies fraud, whether actual fraud or only con-
structive fraud.'0 As one Kentucky court so appropriately said, the
constructive trust is "constructed" by equity to remedy a wrong.'1
One legal writer says that the constructive trust is not implied,
but rather is imposed as a fiat trust. 2
II. RESULTING TRUSTS.
A. Essentials, Purpose & Nature
A resulting trust is an implied-in-fact trust, created by law,
but with a purpose to enforce the intention of the parties.'3 If
the intent is clear, there is an express trust, and if there is am-
biguous intent, such ambiguity may be construed to be an intent
for an implied trust. Where there is no intent expressed in
words however, neither clear nor ambiguous, but the facts and
'Wright v. Yates, supra n. 4; Annotation, Wills-Devolution-Failure of Trust,
IV. Instances of Absolute Gifts, 96 A. L. R. 959, 969 (1935); Howard v. Howard,
133 Ky. 568, 118 S.W. 367 (1909); Brothers v. Porter, 45 Ky. (6 B. Mon.) 106
(1845); Evans, Resulting and Constructive Trusts in Kentucky, 20 Ky. L. J. 383,
383-394 (1932).
'Costigan, supra n. 1, at 452, citing Ames, Lectures On Legal History, 21
HIAv. L. REv. 225, 237-238 (1907).
'Noland v. Howard, 221 Ky. 33, 297 S.W. 942 (1927); Traughber v. King,
235 Ky. 658, 32 S.W. 2d 8 (1930); Long v. Reiss, 290 Ky. 198, 160 S.W. 2d 668
(1942); Dotson v. Dotson, 307 Ky. 106, 209 S.W. 2d 852 (1948); 54 'A.. Jum.,
Trusts 167-169.
0 Dotson v. Dotson, supra n. 9 (raised to circumvent fraud); Moore v. Terry,
293 Ky. 727, 170 S.W. 2d 29 (1943) (looks to see if result of transaction is
"unconscionable"); May v. May, 161 Ky. 114, 170 S.W. 537 (1914) (speaks of
"fraud or inequitable conduct"); Wright v. Yates, supra n. 4 (refers to fraud and
breach of moral or legal duty); 54 Ajs. Jum., Trusts 167-169; Costigan, supra n. 1
at 451.
'Bates v. Bates, 182 Ky. 566, 206 S.W. 800 (1918).
' Costigan, supra n. 1, at 439.
"Wright v. Yates, supra n. 4.
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circumstances surrounding ownership or acquisition of title show
an intent for a trust, the courts will declare a resulting trust from
a given set of facts and circumstances in order to enforce the in-
tention of the parties.14 In the cases where intent for a trust is
clear, or is found in ambiguous words, the courts rely upon direct
proof, but where the intent is not expressed in words, the courts
rely upon indirect or circumstantial proof.
B. K. R. S. 381.170 Applied
It was circumstantial proof that created the most prominent
common law resulting trust, that being the case where A bought
land from B and the title was taken in the name of C, a stranger. 15
The circumstances showed that C was not entitled to the bene-
ficial interest, or use as it was called, because there was no showing
from those facts that there was any intention by A, the one fur-
nishing the consideration, to give C anything but bare legal title.
In those early days it was common for a landowner to hold for the
use or benefit of another. It is now the general practice for the
owner of land to hold it for his own use and benefit. The Ken-
tucky Legislature has enacted a statute changing the old rule.
K. R. S. 381.17016 says:
17
CoNsmEERAIoN PAID BY OTHER THAN GANTE:
EFFEcr. When a deed is made to one person, and the con-
sideration is paid by another no use or trust results in favor
of the latter unless the grantee takes a deed in his own
name without the consent of the person paying the con-
sideration, or unless the grantee in violation of a trust
purchases the lands deeded with the effects of another
person. Such deeds are fraudulent as against the existing
debts and liabilities of the person paying the consideration.
It is evident that the very words of the statute abolish the old
doctrine of resulting trusts in the case of purchase money resulting
trusts just discussed. There is expressly excepted from the pro-
visions of the statute those cases where a breach of duty or trust
occurs, which will be dealt with under constructive trusts, infra,
" Nickels v. Clay, 14 Ky. L. Rep. 925 (1893).
' Similar cases were dealt with in a similar manner. They are not of great
value in a survey of Kentucky law. For an elucidation of English resulting trusts,
however, see Costigan, supra n. 1 at 439 et seq.
Kentucky Revised Statutes, 1953 Edition.
Kentucky Acts of 1893, Ch. 150 Sec. 17, p. 495.
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and where the purchaser did not consent to the title being taken
in the name of the third party. Such lack of consent is a matter to
be proven by he who seeks to establish the trust.'8 It does not mat-
ter that the third party who receives title is a stranger or a person
close to the party paying the purchase price.' 9
C. Current Status of Cases in Kentucky
In view of K. R. S. 381.170, when A buys land from B and the
title is taken in the name of C, a stranger, the presumption from
such facts, contrary to the common law, is that A meant and in-
tended to vest in C both legal title and the equitable title, some-
times called the use or beneficial interest.
The statute does not affect the case of A buying B's land and
then B repurchasing it from A to satisfy his vendor's lien. In
Howard v. Howard20 the Kentucky Court of Appeals said that
where the original vendee, A, continues in possession of the land
after B foreclosed his vendor's lien, and after A's death his widow
and children held possession of it, all with B's knowledge and
without complaint from B, the presumption is a resulting trust
for A and his heirs. Thus we see that the common law idea of
reading into circumstances the apparent existence of a trust is not
changed any further than the statute expressly demands.21
The English Statute of Frauds, which required all trusts in
land to be in writing, did not apply to resulting trusts, so as to
prevent an unjust benefit to the legal titleholder. Kentucky
reaches the same result, and correctly so, by saying that where A
buys from B and has B put title in C, there being a parol agree-
ment by C to hold in trust for A, K. R. S. 381.170 does not control
because that statute applies only to the case where there is no
parol agreement.22 Thus the statute is reduced to one of presump-
tion only, setting up a presumption of law to be drawn from the
bare facts set out in the statute.23 If the party seeking to establish
" Masters v. Masters, 222 Ky. 427, 800 S.W. 894 (1927); Sewell v. Sewell,
260 S.W. 2d 643 (Ky. 1953).
' Clay v. Clay's Gdn., 24 Ky. L. Rep. 2016, 72 S.W. 810 (1903); Traughber
v. King, 235 Ky. 658, 32 S.W. 2d 8 (1930); Sewell v. Sewell, 260 S.W. 2d
643 (Ky. 1953).
o133 Ky. 568, 118 S.W. 367 (1909).
= Also see cases cited supra n. 19.
'Smith v. Smith, 121 S.W. 1002 (Ky. 1909).
' Sewell v. Sewell, 260 S.W. 2d 643 (Ky. 1953); Gibson v. Gibson, 249 S.W.
2d 53 (Ky. 1952).
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a trust can show a parol agreement by the grantee to hold for the
use or benefit of another who furnished the consideration, the
court will enforce that parol agreement because K. R. S. 881.170
does not mention oral agreements. 24 The rule seems correct, be-
cause the statute is enacted in view of the mode of holding title
for oneself, and because the English Statute of Frauds as to uses
was not adopted in Kentucky.25
In Ewing v. Clore26 the Kentucky Court of Appeals said that
if the plaintiff did not actually furnish the consideration for the
sale, it would not avail him to show a contract by which he
promised to furnish it, because the plaintiff did not bring him-
self within the statute which at that time said:
27
When a deed shall be made to one person, and the
consideration shall be paid by another, no use or trust shall
result... (Emphasis supplied).
Since the present statute, now K. R. S. 381.170, does not use
words as indicative of a promise as the italicized words in the
above-mentioned statute do, and since the court construed the
above-mentioned statute to not allow a promise to be the con-
sideration or payment, it is certain that a promise to pay is not
sufficient consideration to make the statute operative today.
Didn't the court go by a roundabout route in reaching the
decision in Ewing v. Clore? It appears that the same result could,
and should, have been reached without trying to fit the case into
the statute, because it is evident that the statute is not the real
reason for the decision, but rather that the statute doesn't even
apply since a prerequisite to its application is the very case which
the court said did not exist here. If the case had come within the
statute the result would have been the same as reached by the
court, but putting the statute aside, we see at once that the ancient
fact situation calling for a resulting trust did not exist. There
being no purchase price given, there can be no unjust enrichment
contrary to the intention of the parties, and there was not sufficient
evidence to establish any trust intent, there being shown merely
an oral promise to convey. It would have been better had the
"Patrick v. Prather, 144 Ky. 771, 189 S.W. 938 (1911).
"Vizard Inv. Co. v. York, 167 Ky. 634, 181 S.W. 370, 372 (1916).2219 Ky. 329, 292 S.V. 824 (1927).
' K. S. See. 2353 as set out in Ewing v. Clore, n. 26 supra, at 825.
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court done as it did in Howard v. Howard,28 and just flatly said
that the common law rule was not changed in a case such as this,
and that the common law rule did not create a trust in this case.
More will be said about Ewing v. Clore from the point of view of
constructive trusts, infra.
Several people may verbally join together and take a joint deed,
apparently for them to share and share alike, and then by parol
evidence show that the parol agreement was other than to share
alike. In such a case a trust in land results for each to the extent
of the amount paid by each.29 Similarly, in the case of a partner-
ship parol evidence may be used to establish the partnership and
its terms in order to create a resulting trust as against the partner
who holds title to the property in the partnership assets.30 There
is an apparent requirement, however, that the agreement be made
before the purchase is made, because an agreement made between
A and B after A purchased the property is in reality a contract to
convey real estate already owned.3'
The doctrine of resulting trusts, although more commonly
applied to real estate, is not limited to real estate cases and is ap-
plied to personal property cases as well.32 The Kentucky statute
discussed does not, however, limit resulting trusts in personal
property.83
An earlier contributor to the Kentucky Law Journal, the late
Dean Alvin E. Evans, has well treated the matter of the failure of
an express trust and a resulting trust arising from the ruins of the
failed express trust.3 4 The Kentucky Court of Appeals has con-
sidered intention as controlling in this matter also, as shown by a
leading case involving a Shaker community.3 5 The case is dis-
cussed in Dean Evans' article. Members contributed their prop-
erty to the Shaker society for the perpetual use of the society, for
the benefit of the members, and with the express agreement that
Supra n. 20.
Brothers v. Porter, 45 Ky. (6 B. Mon.) 106 (1845).
Holliday v. Holliday, 238 Ky. 522, 38 S.W. 2d 436 (1931).
31Wallace v. Marshall, 48 Ky. (9 B. Mon.) 148 (1848).
Turner v. Risner, 280 Ky. 822, 134 S.W. 2d 951 (1939); White v. White,
229 Ky. 666, 17 S.W. 2d 783 (1929).
"See the express words of the statute and the Chapter classification in K. R. S.
where the statute is compiled.
'Evans, Resulting and Constructive Trusts in Kentucky, 20 Ky. L. 1. 383,
384 (1932).
'Easum v. Bohon, 180 Ky. 451, 202 S.W. 901 (1918). See discussion by
Evans, n. 34, supra.
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there should never be a return of the property. Although dissolu-
tion was never contemplated, there came a time when the society
was disbanded and the heirs of a deceased member sought to re-
cover for themselves their decedent's contribution. The court
held that no resulting trust would be enforced for the heirs' bene-
fit, because there was none intended. There is some disagreement
with the result,3 6 but it is in accord with the basic theory of the -
resulting trust, i.e. a resulting trust is enforced only because the
parties intended that the legal titleholder should not also have
the beneficial interest. In the case at hand it was expressly stipu-
lated that the property was for the use of the society, which was
necessarily made up of members, and that the property should
never be returned to the contributor, thus cutting off any op-
portunity for the court to find a trust intent.
The Shaker case illustrates another general rule, it being that
where a third person, C, has paid the consideration for the transfer
of the property by A to B in trust, and the trust or purpose fails,
there is a resulting trust in favor of C, the third person.3 ' In the
instant case the consideration for the transfer was evidently mem-
bership in the society and like conveyances by others, they being
third persons.
The case just discussed further comes within the principle
that when a conveyance in trust is for a valuable consideration,
there is no resulting trust in favor of the grantor or his heirs when
the express trust fails, because in view of the passing of considera-
tion, there is no justification for presuming an intention for
reverter to have been in mind when such intent is not expressly
set out.38 When the express trust that fails is founded on a dona-
tion or will, however, a resulting trust will arise for the benefit of
the donor or his heirs, because there being no consideration for
the conveyance, the law presumes such an understanding or in-
tention as per the doctrine of equitable consideration 3 9
We might well note here that although a resulting trust may
in fact be established by the evidence, the trust is ineffectual as
against a bona fide purchaser without notice.40
"Evans, n. 34 supra, at 385.
1754 Am. Jim., Trusts 154, citing Easum v. Bohon, supra n. 35.
"Ibid.
"54 A. Jun., Trusts 154-155.• Keaton v. Keaton, 294 Ky. 240, 171 S.W. 2d 260 (1943).
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D. Evidence and Degree of Proof
The rule seems well settled, and has been often repeated and
recently reaffirmed by the Kentucky Court of Appeals, that a mere
preponderance of the evidence is not sufficient to establish a re-
sulting trust, and that the facts of a resulting trust must be shown
by a greater degree of proof. The Court of Appeals has con-
sistently said and held that they will require "clear and convincing
evidence" to establish a resulting trust.
41
III. CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS.
A. Essentials, Purpose & Nature
The courts have not always had a clear understanding of the
basic difference between a constructive trust and a resulting
trust,4 but there is a general agreement that a constructive trust
differs from all other trusts, including resulting trusts, in that in-
tention for a trust is not important in the court's decision to en-
force a constructive trust.43 Kentucky's Court of Appeals enforces
a constructive trust in order to remedy a wrong of some nature44
which may or may not amount to actual fraud.45 Although fraud
is one type of imposition from which the courts relieve a party by
imposing a constructive trust,48 the court will also impose a con-
structive trust if the conduct is merely inequitable4 7 or unjust,
48
or even where the court feels that it would be unconscionable for
the holder of the legal title to retain the property,49 such as in a
case of plain mistake.50 The Court of Appeals has said that a con-
structive trust involves the breach of a moral or legal duty on the
part of the one against whom the constructive trust is imposed.51
' Sewell v. Sewell, 260 S.W. 2d 643 (Ky. 1953); Holliday v. Holliday, supra
n. 30; Richardson v. Webb, 281 Ky. 201, 185 S.W. 2d 861 (1940); Bank of
Clarkson v. Meredith, 301 Ky. 671, 192 S.W. 2d 967 (1946); Gayheart v. Cox,
305 Ky. 570, 205 S.W. 2d 153 (1947); Burgraf v. Reynolds, 306 Ky. 104, 206
S.W. 2d 206 (1947).
"See Hunt v. Picklesimer, 290 Ky. 573, 162 S.W. 2d 27, 31 (1942) wherein
the court evidently confused the two.
'Authorities cited n. 9, supra.
"Bates v. Bates, supra n. 11; Traughber v. King, 235 Ky. 658, 32 S.W. 2d 8
(1930).
"May v. May, 161 Ky. 114, 170 S.W. 537 (1914).
"See Dotson v. Dotson, 307 Ky. 106, 209 S.W. 2d 852 (1948).
,May v. May, supra n. 45.
Long v. Reiss, 290 Ky. 198, 160 S.W. 2d 668 (1942).
"Moore v. Terry, 293 Ky. 727, 170 S.W. 2d 29 (1943).
9 0Overton's Heirs v. Woolfolk, 36 Ky. (6 Dana.) 371 (1838).
'Wright v. Yates, 140 Ky. 283, 130 S.W. 1111 (1910).
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Since the very nature of a constructive trust makes its im-
position one of balancing the equities in a given case, a construc-
tive trust is not enforceable against a stranger to the transaction
from which the trust arises.
5 2
B. Effect of K. R. S. 381.170
In an earlier part of this article the Kentucky statute which
limits resulting trusts was discussed.5 3 That statute expressly ex-
cepts from its operation those cases where a breach of duty or
trust occurs, and such cases come within our definition of a con-
structive trust, supra. K. R. S. 381.170 does not affect our study
of constructive trusts, because the statute applies only to purchase
money resulting trusts. New York has a comparable statute that
says, ".... no use or trust results.. ." in certain cases, and Justice
Benjamin Cardozo, then on the New York Court of Appeals, in a
well studied opinion, said that since the statute in New York used
the word "results", the statute applied only to resulting trusts
and did not affect the law of constructive trusts.5 4 Our Kentucky
statute uses the same word. The New York decision above-
mentioned is sound, and Kentucky follows a similar rule, because
the legislature certainly did not intend by its enactment to do
away with the long standing fundamental function of equity
courts, the remedy of unconscionable wrongs.
55
C. Statute of Frauds
It is well settled that the Statute of Frauds does not affect the
enforcement of a constructive trust because a constructive trust
is not based upon transactions between parties which looked to-
ward a trust, but rather upon the function of equity courts in
remedying what, without the intervention of the court, would be
an unconscionable wrong.56
" Ibid.; Lowe v. Lowe, 312 Ky. 640, 229 S.W. 2d 442 (1950).
T Part H, B. K.R.S. 381.170 Applied.
" Foreman v. Foreman, 251 N. Y. 237, 167 N.E. 428 (1929).
' Graham v. King, 96 Ky. 339, 24 S.W. 430, 431 (1893) citing 2 Poimoy,
EQurrY JuiusPnuDEcNC Sees. 1030-1044.
"Swaner v. Hash, 288 Ky. 485, 156 S.W. 2d 852 (1941); Clark v. Smith,
252 Ky. 50, 66 S.W. 2d 93 (1933); Rudd v. Gates, 191 Ky. 456, 280 S.W. 906
(1921); Willis v. Lam, 158 Ky. 777, 166 S.W. 251 (1914); Griffin v. Schlenk,
139 Ky. 523, 102 S.W. 837 (1907); Steifvater v. Steifvater, 246 Ky. 646, 53 S.W.
2d 926 (1932).
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The Kentucky case of Ewing v. Glore was discussed in an
earlier part of this article 7 and it may be well to now revive our
discussion of the case, because of its relation to the Statute of
Frauds. There plaintiff had orally promised defendant that he
would furnish consideration for the purchase of realty by de-
fendant, and plaintiff, never having paid the purchase price,
sought to have a resulting trust declared. Because no considera-
tion was paid, there was no unjust enrichment contrary to the
intention of the parties against which the courts would relieve.
Why didn't the court enforce the promises of defendant as a mat-
ter of constructive trust? The function of equity is not to cir-
cumvent the law, but to relieve where there is no adequate remedy
at law for an injustice. In Ewing v. Glore, the case now under dis-
cussion, the only injustice was that defendant backed out of his
oral promise and stood behind the shield which the law gave him,
the statute which required his contract to be in writing before it
could be enforced. Since the contract was executory on both
sides, there was no inequitable breach of moral or legal duty by
defendant, and the parties were left in statu quo.
The foregoing discussion is to illustrate that although the
Statute of Frauds is no defense against a constructive trust im-
posed by the court, a constructive trust will not be imposed merely
to put aside the Statute of Frauds when there is no showing that
the results would be unconscionable without the intervention of
equity.
An enlightening Kentucky case of recent years is Moore v.
Terry,58 wherein the court was faced with a problem of deciding
whether a constructive trust existed in the light of facts which
showed that H conveyed property to W, his wife, when H was
facing a long prison term. Further facts were that W tried to
convey the same property back to H on her death bed, but failed
to comply with the formal requirements of the law, making the
conveyance attempt void. H sought to enforce a constructive
trust, claiming that W obtained the property from him on a
promise to reconvey it to him when he got out of prison. The
court said that this was not a case calling for a constructive trust,
and made the following enlightening statements:
Part II, C. Current Status of Cases in Kentucky. Citation at n. 26, supra.
' Citation at n. 49, supra.
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The husband conveyed the property to his wife
for the protection of her and their children while he was
confined in prison, but that fact did not constitute a con-
structive trust. It is not unusual for the head of the family
to put the title of the home in his wife or to make a con-
veyance of it to her when ominous clouds appear on the
horizon. And there is no rule of law or equity which says
such actions create a constructive trust in his favor. If such
were the law, the husband could revoke at pleasure his deed
to the wife.
In the instant case there was no misrepresentation,
concealment, undue influence or any advantage taken by
the wife or any circumstance making it unconscionable for
her to retain title to the property. (Emphasis supplied)
Although the foregoing case does not involve the Statute of
Frauds, but instead the Statute of Deeds, the parallel illustration
seems to serve our purpose well.
D. Current Status of Cases in Kentucky
We have already pointed out that equity will impose a con-
structive trust where there is a case of plain mistake, and thus
where A made a deed to C instead of to B, who was the proper
grantee, the court held that C held title subject to a constructive
trust for A in order to prevent an unconscionable result.5 9
When a grantee makes an oral promise to convey or devise
property to another as an inducement for a conveyance to him,
the court enforces a constructive trust for that intended purpose
upon failure of the grantee to do as promised. 0 One court said
that such was "sufficient fraud" to support a constructive trust.61
It has been held in a fairly recent case that the failure of the
party seeking to establish the trust to show that promise by the
requisite degree of proof was sufficient cause for saying that no
constructive trust existed at all.62
Usually the breach of a fiduciary duty, such as agency, 63 em-
"Overton's Heirs v. Woolfolk, n. 50 supra.
' Steifvater v. Steifvater, 246 Ky. 646, 53 S.W. 2d 926 (1932); Farley v.
Gibson, 285 Ky. 164, 30 S.W. 2d 876 (1930); Rudd v. Gates, 191 Ky. 456, 230
S.W. 906 (1921); Chapmans Ex'r v. Chapman, 152 Ky. 344, 153 S.W. 434
(1913); Becker v. Neurath, 149 Ky. 421, 149 S.W. 857 (1912).
e'Becker v. Neurath, n. 60 supra.
Moore v. Terry, n. 49 supra.uAntle v. Haas, 251 S.W. 2d 290 (Ky. 1952).
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ployment,64 trust,6 5 guardian"6 or personal representative 7 in
the matter of property will make a wrongdoer a constructive
trustee. Thus, when a real estate broker agreed to purchase real
estate for a client and instead purchased it for himself, the court
imposed a constructive trust upon the property for the benefit of
the client.66 Although a constructive trust will not be enforced
against a stranger to the wrongdoing,69 yet if there is a third party
involved in the wrongdoing, the fact that he is not the fiduciary
will not protect him, if he knew that what was done was contrary
to the terms of the trust or contract of employment of the
fiduciary.70
Closely akin to the foregoing are the cases of family confidential
relationships and attorney-client confidences. Thus, where the
Court of Appeals found that a father "overreached and mercilessly
cheated" his children in the matter of some real estate, equity con-
structed a trust.71 The mere fact that an attorney represents an
estate and purchases assets of that estate creates a trust for the
heirs. 72 In Hunt v. Picklesimer7 3 the Court of Appeals said that
the trust which arises between a lawyer and his client, when the
lawyer wrongfully acquires his client's property is a resulting trust,
but such a statement does not appear to be founded upon the
essential theory of resulting trusts.74
Kentucky says that the mere wrong in assuming control, as
distinguished from title, over the property of another is sufficient
cause for a constructive trust.75 As a corollary, when a fiduciary
wrongfully sells or disposes of the property of another, the courts
Schwartz Amusement Co. v. Independent Order, Etc., 278 Ky. 563, 128
S.W. 2d 965 (1939).
'Taylor v. Harris' Adm'r, 164 Ky. 654, 176 S.W. 168 (1915).
Ibid.
Thompson v. Fraley, 279 Ky. 323, 130 S.W. 2d 793 (1939).
Antle v. Haas, supra n. 63. There are earlier cases with contrary results.
See Evans, supra n. 34 at 408-409.
Cases cited at n. 52, supra.
1oAntle v. Haas, supra n. 63; Taylor v. Harris' Adm'r, supra n. 65.
'Bates v. Bates, 182 Ky. 566, 206 S.W. 800 (1918).
Walker v. Carter, 208 Ky. 197, 270 S.W. 770 (1925). The court did not
elaborate as to what kind of trust-resulting, constructive, express or implied-was
created, but the facts fit only the law of constructive trusts. In Dean Evans'
article he discussed the case under the subject of constructive trusts. See Evans,
n. 34 supra at 411.
Supra, n. 42.
See Part II, supra.
'Trevathan's Ex'r v. Dee's Ex'rs, 221 Ky. 396, 298 S.W. 975 (1927); Smith
v. Cornett, 26 Ky. L. Rep. 265, 80 S.W. 1118 (1904).
RESULTING AND CONsTmUCrIW TRUsTs
impose a constructive trust upon the proceeds of the sale or dis-
position, in the hands of the fiduciary.
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A few early cases refused to impose a constructive trust in
cases of criminal acts, but the weight of modern authority is that
a constructive trust will be applied in the cases of a plain con-
version of property or wrongful or fraudulent use of another's
property.7
Similar to the case of a resulting trust, a constructive trust
may well be established by the evidence but it is not available
against a bona fide purchaser without notice.
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E. Presumptions and Proof
When a fact situation is shown that would create a construc-
tive trust in accord with the foregoing, the person upon whom the
trust is sought to be imposed must go forward with the evidence
and show payment or disposition of the property as would release
him from his liability as a constructive trustee. 7
Although some of the Kentucky cases announce slightly dif-
ferent rules,80 it is apparently the law that, as in the case of a
resulting trust, the Kentucky Court of Appeals requires "clear and
convincing evidence" such as leaves no reasonable doubt, to estab-
lish a constructive trust,8 ' except that in fiduciary cases only "slight
evidence" is required to establish the constructive trust because
of the relationship of a fiduciary to his transactions.-
2
"Farmers Bank of White Plains v. Bailey, 221 Ky. 55, 297 S.W. 938 (1927);
54 Mf. Jm., Trusts 187-188.
ff54 Am. Jun., Trusts 187-188.
54 Air. Jur., Trusts 189-192; Cf. Keaton v. Keaton, 294 Ky. 240, 171 S.W.
2d 260 (1943) dealing similarly with resulting trusts.
Taylor v. Harris' Adm'r, supra n. 65.
'Taylor v. Fox's Ex'rs, 162 Ky. 804, 73 S.W. 154 (1915) (held that facts
were not established by that "certain and undoubted testimony" which the court
required); May v. May, supra n. 45 (definite, clear and convincing); Deaton v.
Bowling, 302 Ky. 829, 196 S.W. 2d 603 (1946) (definite, clear and convincing);
Moore v. Terry, supra n. 49 (definite, clear and convincing); Curlee v. Hall, 296
Ky. 657, 178 S.W. 2d 193 (1944) (definite and satisfactory); Langford v. Sig-
mon, 296 Ky. 650, 167 S.W. 2d 820 (1943) (clear, strong and convincing);
Clark v. Smith, 252 Ky. 50, 66 SW. 2d 93 (1933) (clear, definite, and un-
equivocal).
'Panke v. Panke, 252 S.W. 2d 909 (Ky. 1952); Reed v. Reed, 273 Ky. 502,
117 S.W. 2d 211 (1938); Cape v. Leach, 283 Ky. 662, 142 S.W. 2d 971 (1940);
Driskill v. Driskill's Adm'r, 307 Ky. 627, 211 S.W. 2d 840 (1948); Knight v.
Rowland, 307 Ky. 18, 209 S.W. 2d 728 (1948).
' Whitsell v. Porter, 309 Ky. 247, 217 S.W. 2d 311 (1949).
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